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A Note on a Core Catcher of a Cooperative Game 
By T. S. H. Driessen I 
Abstract: In Driessen (1986) it is shown that for games satisfying a certain condition the core of 
the game is included in the convex hull of the set of certain marginal worth vectors of the game, 
while it is conjectured that the inclusion holds without any condition on the game. In this note it 
is proved that the inclusion holds for all games. 
Zusammenfassung: I  Driessen (1986) wurde for Spiele, die eine gewisse Bedingung erfiillen, ge- 
zeigt, daft der Kern des Spieles in der konvexen Hiille yon gewissen Vektoren der Marginalwerte 
liegt. Es wurde vermutet, dat~ diese Inklusion ohne weitere Bedingung an das Spiel gilt. In dieser 
Note wird nun gezeigt, dat~ die Inklusion ffir alle Spiele gilt. 
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A cooperative n-person game in characteristic funct ion form is a pair (N, v) where 
N= (1 ,2 ,  . . . ,n} (n t> 1) and vis  a real-valued function on the family 2 N of all subsets 
of N,  satisfying v(0) = 0. The function v itself will also be called an n-person game. 
The family of all n-person games is denoted by G n , while on  denotes the set of all 
permutations on N. 
9 I ) _ _  ~d 7d Let v E G n The core C(v), the upper vector b - (bx ,  b2 . . . .  , b v) E IR. n and the 
gap funct ion gV : 2 N ~ ~ of the game v are defined by 
C(v) := (x E IR n; ~ x i = v(N) and 
j ew jES 
b~ := v(N) - v (N-  (i}) for all i E N ,  
xi >~ v(S) for all S c N, S r (~} 
gV(O) :=0 and 
gV(S) := ~2 b~-v(S)  foraU SCN,  S--/=~. 
jEs  
In Driessen (1986; cf. proposition 2.1) it is shown that 
xi <~ b v for all x E C(v) and all i EN  (1) 
gV(N-  (i})=gV(N) for all i EN .  (2) 
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Let v E G n , k E N and 0 E O n . Then for a player i E N we define the set pO by pO := 
{] E N; O(j) < O(i)}, while the marginal worth vector x 0, k(v ) E IR n of the game v with 
respect o the coalition size up to k is given by 
xiO'k(V) := v(Pi 0 U { i}) -v (P  O) 
= b~. 
= bV -gV(N) + gV(p~ ) 
if O(i) < k 
if o(g) >k  
if O(i)= k. 
Note that x~ = v(Pi ~ tO (i}) -v (p  O) for all i EN  because of (2). Let Wk(v) be the 
convex hull of the set of all marginal worth vectors of the game v, i.e. Wk(v) := cony 
(x~ 0 E On}. For the interpretations of  the above notions we refer to Driessen 
(1986), where it is also shown that the set Wk(v) is a core catcher whenever a certain 
condition is satisfied by the game v. 
Theorem 1 (cf. Theorem 5.2 in Driessen 1986): C(v) C Wk(v) whenever vE G n and 
k E N such that 
gV(N) >>- gV(S) for all S C N with IS I = k - 1. 
Here IS I denotes the number of elements of S C N. The purpose of this note is to 
prove that the inclusion C(v) C Wk(v) holds for all vE  G n and all k EN.  The essential 
idea in the proof is to look at the corresponding game v k E G n defined by 
vk(S) := v(S) if ISI < k 
= v(N) - N b~ if ISI t> k. (3) 
]EN--S 
In the next lemma we give two properties of  the game v k in relation to the original 
game v. 
Lemma 2: Let vE  G n and k EN.  Then 
(i) C(v) C C(vk) 
(ii) xO'n(vk)=xO'k(V) for all OEO n. 
Proof." (i) Let x E C(v). Then N xj = v(N) = vk(Ar), ~, 
jEN ]ES 
while for S C N with JS [/> k we have also 
xj>~v(S) for all $4:~}, 
x j=v(g) -  Z x i />v(N)- ~ b~=vk(S) 
]ES jEN--S ]EN-S 
where the last inequality follows from (1). Hence, x E C(vk). 
(ii) Let 0 E 0 n and i EN.  I f  O(i) < k, then [P ~ I < k - 1 and hence 
xO,~(v) = v(P  o u ( i ) )  - v (P? )  = v~(P ~ u (/}) - v~(P?)  -- x~ 
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If 0(/) > k, then left[ t> k and hence 
x~ = by = u - v, ,(P ~ = x~ 
If 0(t') = k, then LP~ = k - 1 and hence 
xi~ : b v -gV(N) + gV(p~ ) : v(N) - ]E b 7 - v(pi ~ 
i;o q) > k 
= vk(P 0 U ( i ) ) -vk (P  O) =Xfl'n(vk). 
We see that x ~ k(v) = x ~ (vk) for all i E N. [] 
Now we are able to prove the fact that the set Wk(v) is always a core catcher. 
Theorem 3: C(v) C Wk(v) for all vE  G n and all k EN.  
Proof." Let v E G n and k EN.  By applying (2) with v k in the role of v, we have 
gVk(N) = gVk(S) for all S C N with [SI = n - 1. 
Now we conclude from Theorem 1 that C(vk) C wn(vk). By Lemma 2 we have also 
that C(v) C C(vk) and 
Wn(vk) = cony (xO'n(vk); 0 E 0 n } = conv {x~ O E 0 n } = Wk(v). 
Hence it follows that C(v) C C(vk) C wn('Ok) = Wk('O). [] 
We recall that the set Wk(v) coincides with the core if and only if the game v is a so- 
called k-convex game (cf. Theorem 5.3 in Driessen 1986). Finally we remark that the 
game v k as given by (3) turns out to be very useful to determine several solution con- 
cepts of k-convex games v (Driessen 1985 and to appear). 
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